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This paper uses empirical evidence to examine whether people take more risk for their own 
potential loss/gain and less risk for other people’s potential loss/gain or vice versa.  An 
experiment is described wherein participants had the option of taking different risks in exchange 
for their own benefit and the benefit of others.  Results indicate that subjects take a statistically 
significant higher level of risk for themselves as individuals than they do when other’s payoffs are 
at stake.  This indicates that people are less risk averse in making decisions for themselves and 
more risk averse in making decisions that affect others.  However, when the amount of reward is 
increased, the findings change.  The purpose of the experiment is to find a better explanation for 
how government-owned businesses or large corporations work, where anecdotal evidence 
suggests much less innovation and risk taking takes place compared to small proprietary firms.   
 





usiness management often involves assessing risk in project investments.  One of the more interesting 
aspects of risk taking compares how much risk small ―dynamic‖ firms take compared to large 
―stodgy‖ firms, especially large government-owned firms.  The Bureau of Labor Statistics (see 
Helfand et. al. 2007) for example shows that small firms in proportion to their size have made a bigger contribution 
to the economy in terms of numbers of new jobs created than have larger firms. One reason small firms may have 
higher growth rates (and a higher probability of failure) is because there is more risk taking in those firms than in 
large firms, especially large publicly owned firms.  One reason a small firm may take more risk than a large or a 
government owned firm is because the main decision maker in a small firm is the entrepreneur who is deciding risk 
for his own loss or gain where as in a large or government firm, the main decision maker is deciding risk for other 
people‘s loss or gain.  In this paper, we want to investigate how much risk taking individuals actually carry out 
under two scenarios that may mimic the management decision making of a small private firm versus a large publicly 
owned firm.  One scenario is where participants choose a risky decision for their own benefit.  A second scenario is 
where participants choose a risky decision for the benefit of others.   
 
According to Stoner (1961) the term ―risky shift‖ and ―cautious shift‖ explain changes in risk taking levels.  
Risky shift refers to a situation where people start at their average level of risk taking, usually a risk averse level, and 
then due to exogenous circumstances become less risk averse.  Cautious shift refers to a situation where people start 
at their average level of risk taking and then due to exogenous circumstances become more risk averse.  This paper 
uses empirical evidence to examine whether it is true that people are less risk averse for their own potential gains 
and more risk averse for other people‘s potential gains, i.e. whether there is a cautious shift or a risky shift in 
decision making for others compared to oneself.  An experiment is described wherein participants had the option of 
B 
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taking different risks for different potential gains both for their own benefit and for the benefit of others.  Results 
indicate that subjects have a statistically significant lower level of risk aversion for themselves as individuals than 
they do when other‘s payoffs are at stake.  This indicates that people exhibit a cautious shift where they are 
relatively less risk averse in making decisions for themselves and relatively more risk averse in making decisions 
that affect others.  This parallels how business leaders take risk depending on if they are taking the risks for their 
own gain or if they are taking the risks for other people‘s gain.  Interestingly, even government bureaucrats such as 
pharmaceutical regulators, who must determine other‘s risk, can show greater risk aversion when they decide to 
prohibit new drugs on the market even though these new drugs could save lives but have significant side effects or 
other unintended consequences including death (Ward 1992). 
 
A second iteration of the experiment provided a higher pay-off.  This result found that the higher pay off 
changed the outcomes so that the cautious shift affect was lost.  The change in the cautious shift when higher 
payoffs were used may be attributable to people becoming more prone to gambling based on early risk taking 
results.  This is explained further in Section 6:  Data and Results.   
 
2. THEORETICAL LITERATURE 
 
Looking at the literature on risk and how it affects behavior, Stoner (1961), Kogan and Wallach (1964), and 
Wallach, Kogan, and Bem (1962) proposed the Risky Shift Phenomenon, which explains how individuals, when 
placed in a group, take more risks than they would otherwise.  In other words, a person‘s normal level of risk taking 
changes when these same people are in different environments.  Specifically people look to take more risks in a 
group than they would normally do by themselves.  The Risky Shift Phenomenon explains why a mob can become 
unruly, where individuals—prodded by their peers—engage in risky illegal activities in which they would not 
otherwise participate (see Sorrentino et. al. 1992).  This has been further developed into the Group Polarization 
Effect by Levine and Moreland (1998) where groups can be pushed by a dominant personality to become more risk 
loving or more risk averse in certain situations. 
 
The problem with the literature on risky shift and group polarization is that they emphasize decisions made 
in public by a spontaneous grouping whereas many decisions made in business within a large corporation or by a 
government-owned entity are likely to be deliberated and decided upon in private by an individual or a small group.  
Business decisions are usually not deliberated and decided upon in a public setting with a lot of fanfare.  Where the 
decision making entity is isolated, the entity may become more risk averse if it is making decisions that mostly 
benefit others rather than itself.  To put it in another way, this may result in a cautious shift rather than a risky shift. 
 
Interestingly, Stoner originally was trying to prove that people would exhibit a cautious shift rather than a 
risky shift, since he believed that people would become more cautious when making decisions in front of a group.  
Stoner‘s motivation is based on an anecdote by General James M. Gains who evaluated military generals throughout 
history and their decisions to take risks.  As each general takes on more responsibility, the risk taking level is 
reduced.  For example Kowert and Hermann (1997) note that high ranking generals, who were identified as 
vacillating in their later careers, were noted for their daring and determination as junior officers.  While the 
relationship could be due to age and experience, it could also be because of the greater responsibility and public 
accounting which coincide with achieving a higher rank.  Thus it seems that as individuals take on greater 
responsibility they exhibit a cautious shift and this may affect business decision making as well.   
 
The idea of the cautious shift does show some validity in business.  March and Shapira (1987) show that 
company managers may shift their level of risk taking depending on circumstances.  Swalm (1966) shows that 
managers appear to have an excessive aversion to any outcome that could yield a net loss.  This is not simply loss 
aversion, which is simply to eschew projects with low expected values, but rather it is risk aversion where managers 
refrain from projects that have wide probability distributions.  Viscusi et. al. (1987) conclude that managers are 
extremely reluctant to accept responsibility where there is even a small increase in the probability of a disaster.  
Miller and Ross (1975) argue that managers assess risk based on the worst possible outcome.  Kahneman and 
Lavallo (2002) suggest that managers tend to make bold forecasts and yet take timid choices.  Also Kahneman and 
Tversky‘s (2002) research shows that individuals over-emphasize extreme outcomes.   
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In the case of a government-owned oil company, Ramsey (1980) shows interesting results that an 
asymmetry may exist whereby a business loss by a government company could result in a larger decline in the 
constituents‘ utility than an analogous gain would raise it.  This may be due to the fact that increased government 
revenue would be subdivided into a myriad of different projects, effectively diluting whatever benefits the extra 
profits give.  On the other hand, losses generated by a government-owned oil company have a clear impact—higher 
taxes or program cuts—and the constituents may feel that their tax money had been wasted on a questionable 
endeavor.  This asymmetry in utility changes for gains and losses of national income follows Friedman and Savage 
(1948) and Markowitz (1952) ideas of utility and Khaneman and Tversky‘s (2002) prospect theory and is a political 
consideration that may make monopoly national oil companies more risk averse than private enterprises.   
 
The difference between Stoner‘s risky shift and alternative arguments for a cautious shift may have to do 
with how much money is on the line or in the case of generals how many lives are on the line.  For example, Holt 
and Laury (2002 and 2005) show an increase in risk aversion with increasing payments.  Another difference as 
mentioned is that the decisions about risk in Stoner‘s experiment are made in front of a group; while decisions in 
business are often made in isolation and then revealed only after the results are apparent.  Thus a business manager, 
unlike Stoner‘s subjects, must make in private those risky decisions that affect corporate stockholders realizing that 
the results will be revealed later.  If politically there is a strong likelihood that negative outcomes are going to have a 
greater weight than positive outcomes, managers, who often make decisions in private, are more apt to take a 
cautious shift in decision making than a risky shift in comparison to their own personal level of risk taking.     
   
3. SOME EXPERIMENTAL LITERATURE 
 
Looking at the experimental literature on risk taking, Holt and Laury (2002), Harrison et. al. (2005a), Holt 
and Laury (2005), Chakravarty et. al. (2005) and Harrison et. al. (2005b) all use a similar approach to measuring risk 
taking by having individuals make a set of decisions incrementally from one side of a risk taking scenario to 
another.  In general Holt and Laury find that subjects are risk averse and that increased incentives increase risk 
aversion by test subjects.  Chakravarty et. al. find that people are highly risk averse when choosing risk for 
themselves, but that when subjects make anonymous choices for others they are less risk averse.  Therefore, the 
Chakravarty et. al. results seem to vindicate Stoner‘s results even though in the Chakravarty experiment the subjects 
were isolated from the group.  Also Harrison et. al. (2005b) shows very little difference in risk preferences between 
individual decisions for the subjects own gain and individual‘s anonymous decisions for other's gain.   
 
In the Harrison et. al. (2005b) study even though participants choose for others, it was still a group decision 
since each participant could only vote for a group‘s payoff choice.  However, the Chakravarty experiment has 
individuals making independent decisions for others. 
 
The procedures used in these experiments of eliciting a series of decisions that slowly change is rather like 
a manager of a company that gains experience about what it is like to make a risky decision for oneself and for 
others.  However, it is often the case that a business must make decisions one at a time and that a single decision will 
be so unique, either in circumstances or in value, in comparison to previous decisions that no amount of experience 
will help.  In those instances, it would be good to test how a single valuable option is decided upon.  This is the case 
that we hope to show here.  
 
Another interesting experimental approach is Charness and Jackson (2007) where participants play a 
version of Jean–Jacques Roseau‘s classic stag hunt similar to a prisoner‘s dilemma game.  In the Charness and 
Jackson version, though, instead of a single player playing each side of the game, a team of 2 players play each side 
with one team member being the dictator or chief decision maker for the team.  In the Charness and Jackson results, 
unlike the Chakravarty et. al. results, there is more risk aversion for participants making decisions for others in 
comparison to making such decisions for oneself. 
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4. THE RISK AVERSE MODEL 
 
Newendorp and Schuyler (2000) show how decision making at the margin works.  Figure 1 shows a typical 
decision rule for making risky choices, where a manager must make a trade off between risk and the rate of return.  
There are three curves.  One curve is a base case ―iso-utility‖ curve.  If a person is at point ―B‖, then the only way 
that he will take more risk is if he is compensated with a higher rate of return.  Thus his iso-utility curve is upward 
sloping and concave.  However, he will accept a lower rate of return if he is compensated with less risk.  The risk 
taking utility curve is concave because of the law of diminishing marginal utility for preferences.   The second curve 
at point ―A‖ is exactly like the first except this is the iso-utility curve of a more risk loving entity.  What the figure 
shows is that those who are more risk loving do indeed gain a higher present value—return on investment—whereas 
those who are more risk averse gain less.  The more risk loving people use additional levels of risk taking as an input 
into production in order to increase their gain.  The third curve is the ―iso-capital‖ constraint curve.  What this curve 
shows is that if a company or government-owned entity faces a constraint on the amount of capital that it has 
available for investment, it must choose between using more or less risk as an input into its investment ―production 
function‖ to increase present value.  The iso-capital constraint curve is convex due to the law of diminishing returns, 
i.e. the first use of risk creates a huge marginal gain to investment outcomes, but the more risk is used, the lower the 
marginal gain to risk becomes.   
 
One example of this capital constraint is to imagine that a company has an extra $100 million to spend this 
year and must decide how to invest it.  There are three options.  One is to invest in a new endeavor, such as a new 
product line with new manufacturing capacity, which is highly risky but does have a high expected pay off.  A 
second option is to put the money into extra maintenance of existing manufacturing facilities.  The extra 
maintenance will simply give a higher assurance of having no future maintenance problems and therefore reduce 
future potential costs but have a lower expected payoff.  There is also less risk involved.  A third option is to give 
employees a bonus.  This will possibly increase morale and encourage harder work or less attrition and create almost 
no risk of further losses.  It may however earn a very low corporate payoff.  The capital available for all these 
investment options is constrained and therefore investing the capital into high risk high return options that can create 

































1. Iso-Utility Curve for more risk averse manager
2. Iso-Utility Curve for less risk averse manager
3. Typical company Iso-capital constraint curve
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To determine if the cautious shift phenomenon occurs where a person moves from ―point A‖ to ―point B‖ 
on Figure 1 depending on whether he is choosing a bet for his own or other people‘s loss or gain, we test whether a 
player in isolation bets on his own potential gain differently from how he bets on other people‘s potential gain.  The 
difference in having potential gains for the player versus having potential gains for others is likely to cause a shift in 
how much risk the player will take.  This is different from Beard and Beil (1994) where negative outcomes are 
incorporated in their study.  In our experiment, when the person chooses for the benefit of others in the group there 
is neither punishment nor reward but just the knowledge that the others won more or less, i.e. the player doesn‘t win 
more money along with the group.  Such a situation is very a propos to a government-owned business, since its 
managers are bureaucrats who will likely not directly benefit in the outcomes of decisions they make, but who must 
nevertheless decide risk for other‘s losses or gains.  Since many government-owned businesses are often monopolies 
that have a single manager or board entity in charge and no competition, the manager may take fewer risks than he 
would take if all the gains were for himself, or if there were competitors that could take away market share if 
nothing is done.   
 
Such a government-owned entity has to make risky decisions that involve large payoffs or losses to the 
country, or in the case of a large firm to the stockholders.  But unlike the environment of the risky shift 
phenomenon, these risky decisions about business development will be made in isolation by the bureaucrats or 
managers away from the political mêlée.  Their decisions may not affect their own personal welfare.  Nevertheless, 
eventually the decision will be revealed and the person making the decision will be held accountable.  Therefore, 
rather than an individual or group making a decision in a crowd or with a lot of fanfare as in the original Risky Shift 
Phenomenon, now the individual decision maker must make his decision in isolation but still knows that the 
decision will be revealed in time.  In that case the decision maker may be reluctant to take risks that could 
potentially cause a loss of money to the government and the people of the country or to stakeholders of a large 
corporation because they want to avoid any criticism.  In a public setting like a game show with people yelling at 
you what to do, you can easily rationalize a loss due to the fact that you were doing what the crowd wanted you to 
do.  However, a decision in private that is revealed later carries the burden that only the decision maker will bare.  In 
fact Sniderman et. al. (1991) show decision makers become more risk averse when they expect their choices to be 
reviewed by others.   
 
To test the hypothesis that decision makers become more risk averse when they must decide over other 
people‘s potential gain or loss, an experiment was set up.  In the first experiment an individual has the choice of 
taking a risk with a given payoff for his own benefit or not taking a risk at all for a guaranteed benefit.  In a second 
experiment, the very same individual is asked to make the same risk decision but this time for the benefit of a group 
of other people and not for him or herself.  Results showed that when they chose for themselves individuals took 
greater risks for their own personal gain, but when given the same choice for the gain or loss of others, the subjects 
had a cautious shift and became relatively more risk averse.   
 
As mentioned above, a second experiment with higher pay-offs provided an alternative analysis.  We found 
that with higher payoffs, there was no shift whatsoever between decisions for oneself and decisions for others.  A 
full discussion of these results is given below in Section 4 Data and Results.  The overall results though may explain 
why some government-owned companies are not aggressively expanding their business as they might otherwise do 
in the private sector since they are risk averse to new investments.  Risk aversion may be creating an impediment for 
starting new projects.   
   
5. GAME SET UP 
 
One option to determine risk aversion for one‘s self and for decisions for the sake of others is to use a Holt 
and Laury (2002) approach where subjects make a series of decisions to show their own attitude towards risk and are 
then offered the chance to make the same decisions for others‘ benefit as well.  One criticism of this approach is that 
by having a series of decisions, it may cause subjects to change their risk attitudes mid-experiment.  The first 
decision in the set may affect the second decision etc.  Even if the sequence is reversed, the experience of deciding 
may change someone‘s attitudes.  While the Holt and Laury approach looks to be a classic risk analysis method, the 
Charness and Jackson experiment of a single decision looks to be a good alternative approach to see if risk attitudes 
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change.  In this paper, we present results from an experiment where a single decision was made for oneself, and a 
single decision was made for the benefit of others. 
 
In the first experiment an individual had the choice of taking a risk with a given payoff for his own benefit 
or not taking a risk at all for a guaranteed benefit.  In a second experiment, the very same individual was asked to 
make the very same risk decision but this time for the benefit of a group of other people.  Results showed that when 
participants chose for themselves, the majority of them took the risk of trying to win more money, giving up the 
guaranteed money.  However when given the exact same choice to make for the potential gain of others, the 
majority of the subjects became more risk averse and more often took the guaranteed money for the others.   
 
Students from economics principles, business, biology and other classes were randomly assigned to groups 
of 4 to 6.  Participants‘ ages varied in line with typical undergraduate classes and included members of both sexes.  
The decision to place certain people into a group was arbitrary.  Each group was put into a room.  Each participant 
in the group drew a pen to randomly chosen the first to participate.  All the pens drawn were exactly the same except 
one, which had a hidden mark on it.  The person who drew that pen became the decision maker but did not know 
that he or she would be the only decision maker.  Nothing was explained to the group about the experiment except 
that a disclaimer was read thanking them for participating and that they could win up to $25.  
 
The single individual decision maker was then taken into a betting room where he was given a choice.  The 
first option was to take a $10 payoff with total certainty for himself.  The second choice was to relinquish the certain 
$10 and roll two dice for a chance to win $25.  Rolling a 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, or a 7, won the student $25.  If he rolled an 8, 
9, 10, 11 or a 12, though, he lost everything, and received no money at all.  Each participant was informed that the 
probability of winning the $25 was 58%; the probability of losing was 42%, and each was informed how rolling the 
dice achieved that probability.  Therefore the expected value of the bet also explained to the subject was $25 x 0.58 
= $14.5 compared to the certain payoff of not taking the bet of $10, which was explained.  When each participant 
entered and was told his choice, 74% of the participants choose to roll the dice for the higher valued prize and gave 
up the sure $10.  Once the participant decided what to do, he either rolled the dice or did not depending on his 
choice.  After the play, he received or was promised in writing his individual winnings. 
 
Next the participant was told that no other player from his group was going to play the game, but that he 
was going to have to represent the other members of the group.  As the group representative, that player was going 
to make the same decision that he had just made for himself for all of the other members of his group.  That is, he 
was going to decide whether the other group members would get a sure $10 per person or give up the guaranteed 
cash for a chance to win $25 per person.  His own winnings were already secure and he was informed that the 
decision facing him would neither gain him more money nor reduce his prior earnings.  The other group members 
did not yet know he would be making the decision for them.  What is more, it was going to be the single participant 
making the decision in isolation and also throwing the dice (if he chose to gamble).  That participant also understood 
that his decision would be revealed to the others when they came in.  All was done in seclusion only to be revealed 
to the rest of the group right after all the decisions and rolls were done.  Depending on how the individual choose, 
the game would end if he decided not to roll the dice, but if he decided to take the risk of possibly winning more 
cash for every group member, he would then roll the dice.  At the conclusion of either choice, the group would be 
brought in and told the result.  
 
One of the concerns of the above experiment was that it is not clear if the group representative is affected 
more by the group‘s average or aggregate winnings.  That is, does the subject make a decision based on the average 
benefit (the payoff) for each member of the group or does he focus on the entire group‘s aggregated benefits (the 
payoff times N members)?  In the experiment, we always explained the average winnings for the group, but the 
group size did vary from 4 to 6.  As it is we chose from the start to present the decision payoff for the participant‘s 
group in terms of the average winnings per person which we feel best represents people‘s understanding of how the 
payoff affects people in their group.   
 
Another potential criticism encompasses order effects.  According to Harrison et. al. (2005a) the order of 
events makes a difference in people‘s approach to risk.  That is if you experience risk taking once, it changes your 
risk behavior.  Therefore, if a participant decides to take a risk for the group before doing so for himself, that will 
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make a difference in his risk preference.  However there are two problems with changing the order in our 
experiment, one is group cohesion and the other is payment. 
 
We put the entire group together at first to create a sense of community so that at the very least, the group 
representative had a mild interest in maximizing the groups well being, mimicking decision makers in the real 
world.  Harrison et al.‘s (2005a) argues that order effects (in Harrison‘s case about the magnitude of a prize) are a 
vital part of risk experiments.  Thus they point out that the order can create an interaction between decision maker 
events.  For example, the experience of taking risks and enduring the results may change your risk attitude.  We 
account for this experience by noting whether participants change their behavior for others based on the results of 
their initial bet.  However, in this experiment, we stress that the participants needed to be mildly interested in ―their‖ 
group.  Once you create a group feeling and one person is separated out, that person will still have a sense of being a 
part of the group.  If you change the order, the participant immediately assumes that he is also going to reap the 
same reward that everyone else obtains.  Once you explain he or she is not to receive any reward, other than a 
participator fee, you get the unwanted interaction of the participant not caring for the group.  Therefore, if you say 
there is no reward for the participant, you lose group cohesion and the certainty that the participant is mildly 
interested in maximizing the group‘s well being. 
 
The second problem is that when a decision maker makes a decision for other‘s in the real world, even 
CEOs, they are always paid first before they make a decision for others.  It is almost never the case that anyone is 
forced to make a decision for others first, and then get paid later with the risk that you may not get paid at all.  
Indeed CEOs, even when given stock options (which theoretically means they are making risky decisions for their 
own as well as other‘s benefits) are actually still guaranteed a pay package.  As Carr (2007) says, ―The oxymoron of 
the ‗entrepreneurial manager‘ is shown up by safety devices such as guaranteed bonuses, severance pay, hugely 
generous provision if the company changes hand, perks, accelerated vesting options and massive pension 
contributions.‖  So if risk taking agents are not forced to take risks first and then get paid later in the real world, 
there is no reason to model it in the experimental world.  Thus if we find a difference between risk taking for oneself 
and risk taking for the sake of others, in the sequence modeled, then this gives good evidence for what is happening 
in the real world.  Even in physics there can be differences in reactions when directions change.  Magnets often 
exhibit hysteresis, where their pull changes when an object is dragged on top of it, but that change in magnetism 
does not imply that there is no magnetism. 
 
6. DATA AND RESULTS  
 
A first set of 26 student groups were run.  These groups were run during and after classes and therefore the 
size of the groups ranged between 4 to 6 people.  The groups included mostly freshmen and sophomore students of 
both sexes although some upper classmen and graduate students did take part.  The groups were selected arbitrarily.  
Each group‘s representative player was chosen by a random draw.  The results of the first set are shown in Table 1.  
The table shows how many players switched or did not switch from their original decision.  We call betting the ―risk 
option‖ and not betting the ―safe option.‖  The results show 11 of 26 players (42%) had a cautious shift, while only 1 
of 26 players (4%) had a risky shift.  Table 2 shows the results of whether the two populations, i.e. the set of bets for 
oneself and the set of bets for others pooled together, have the same mean or whether they have a statistically 
different mean.  With 26 samples of data we can reject the hypothesis that they are the same at the 0.5% level.  Since 
the mean decision to take risk for others is much less than the mean decision to take risks for oneself, this shows a 
tendency for greater risk aversion for decision making for the benefit of others. 
 




Table 1:  First Group of Students 






Number Per Cent 
Risk Safe 11 42% 
Risk Risk 8 31% 
Safe Safe 6 23% 
Safe Risk 1 4% 
Sample Size 26 
Note:  The same subjects did both tests 
Table 2:  First Group of Students 
Pooled Test of Difference in Betting Probabilities 
For Self For Others 
Average Probability  0.731 0.346 
of taking bet 
Sample Size 26 26 
Note:  The same subjects did both tests 
Difference in probablilities 0.385 
Variance of difference 0.22 
t statistic 2.96 
Two-Tail Probability p<0.5% 





Table 3:  First Group of Students
Correlation of winning for self to betting for others
Win Self Bet Others
Win Self 1
Bet Others 0.08 1
t= 0.33 Therefore there is no correlation
between wining the bet for oneself  
and betting for others 
at 10% level for one-tailed test
Table 4:  Second Group of Students







Risk Safe 21 36%
Risk Risk 19 32%
Safe Safe 10 17%
Safe Risk 9 15%
Sample Size 59
Note:  The same subjects did both tests
Table 5:  Second Group of Students
Pooled Test of Difference in Betting Probabilities
For Self For Others
Average Probability 0.677966 0.474576
of taking bet
Sample Size 59 59
Note:  The same subjects did both tests
Difference in probablilities 0.203
Variance of difference 0.238
t statistic 2.32187
Two-Tail Probability p<5%
Table 6:  Second Group of Students
Correlation of winning for self to betting for others
Win Self Bet Others
Win Self 1
Bet Others 0.08 1
t= 0.47 Therefore there is no correlation
between wining the bet for oneself  
and betting for others 
at 10% level for one-tailed test
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However it may be the case that if one wins or loses in the initial bet for oneself, that will in some way taint 
how one bets for others.  So in Table 3 the correlation is tested whether winning the bet for yourself induces a 
greater probability to bet for others.  The correlation there tests false.  There is no correlation between winning the 
first bet and taking the second bet.  The t-statistic for the correlation test is too low to be able to reject the null 
hypothesis that there is no correlation between the two.   
 
After the first run of the experiment was finished, we received a second grant which allowed us to re-run 
the experiment.  We did so and managed to obtain 59 data sets, 90% of which were groups made up of six players 
arbitrarily arranged, the rest being made up of five players.  The groups included members of both sexes, mostly 
undergraduates from freshmen to seniors and some graduate students.  This time we had enough money to pay a 
show up fee which allowed us more flexibility to organize groups outside of class.  Table 4 shows that 21 of 59 
players had a cautious shift (36%) while 9 of 59 players had a risky shift (15%).  The difference between betting for 
one self and betting for others was smaller in this second set, but with the higher number of data points, the 
difference was nevertheless still quite large as shown in Table 5.  People, are more likely to bet when they are 
playing for themselves than when playing for the benefit of others.  Table 6, similar to Table 3, shows that whether 
you win or lose, if you take the bet for yourself it does not affect your decision to take the bet for others.  Table 7, 8 
and 9 combine the data for both of the first two groups and again show that people are more risk averse when 
choosing to bet for others.  Table 7 shows that 32 of 85 (38%) total participants had a cautious shift, while only 10 
of 85 (12%) had a risky shift.   
 
At this point, we wanted to try one variation so we ran a third group of students again from freshman to 
seniors and both sexes arbitrarily grouped together. This time we raised the stakes just as in the study by Holt and 
Laury (2002) did.  We changed the winnings for a successful gamble from $25 to $50.  We changed the guaranteed 
value of not betting from $10 to $20.  This changed the results.  Table 10 shows the results and now there is 
surprisingly no difference between people who exhibit a cautious shift, 9 of 42 for 21%, versus people who exhibit a 
risky shift, again 9 of 42 people for 21%.  This then is similar to Harrison et. al. (2005b).  Table 11 shows that there 
is no difference between people taking the bet for oneself and taking the bet for others.  Decisions are very close to 
50/50, that is there is about a 50/50 chance people will take the bet for themselves and a 50/50 chance they will take 
the bet for others.  Interestingly, the probability of choosing to bet became close to the probability of winning a bet, 
i.e. 58% for a win and 42% for a loss.  We also tested to see if there was a difference between groups 1 and 2 and 
group 3, but found the data too small to test the differences in the decisions for oneself or test differences in the 
decisions for the benefit of others. 
 
We might speculate though that with higher values for the non-betting options, i.e. the guaranteed $20 for 
not betting, that that extra money was enough to tip individuals who would normally bet, to becoming more risk 
averse and not betting.  However why would the same $20 not also cause the people to bet even less for the benefit 
of others?  Clearly the higher level of betting adds pressure to the decision maker and it may be that people are 
concerned, as they often told us during the experiments, of what others would think of them.  One hypothesis that 
could be pursued is that the genetic make up of individuals affects their risk preference.  Some neurological studies 
suggest that the brain make up affects how we relate to others and how much risk we normally take.  The higher 
value payoffs may trigger a different response to risk and the relationship to others.  See Kosfeld (2007), Berg et. al. 
(1995) and Kreek et. al. (2005).  Also Baker II, Laury and Williams (2007) show that groups are more likely than 
individuals to choose a safe lottery in low winning percentages, but less likely to choose the safe lottery in high 
winning percentages.    
 
Interestingly, we found here a marginally significant correlation between winning a bet and taking the bet 
for others.  Table 12 shows that there is a small correlation between winning the bet for yourself and making the bet 
for others.  Possibly with more money on the line, people are more likely to be influenced by the results of their 
initial bet, if they made one.  In other words, even though a participant may say that they believe the dice are fair, 
sub-consciously if he wins a high stakes bet, he may believe that he will win again. i.e. that there is some skill 
involved.  A low stakes bet doesn‘t affect him as much.  This suggest that it is possible that with more experience, 
decision makers that have had a big loss at one point will afterwards be more risk averse than decision makers who 
have yet to lose big.  For example, Jablonowski (2006) shows that experienced oil drilling platform managers in the 
Gulf of Mexico are quicker to evacuate the platform when a hurricane comes than inexperienced managers, i.e. 
experience of large risks, e.g. one‘s own life, leads to caution.   
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Table 7:  Combined First and Second Group of Students 






Number Per Cent 
Risk Safe 32 38% 
Risk Risk 27 32% 
Safe Safe 16 19% 
Safe Risk 10 12% 
Sample Size 85 
Note:  The same subjects did both tests 
Table 8:  Combined First and Second Group of Students 
Pooled Test of Difference in Betting Probabilities 
For Self For Others 
Average Probability  0.694118 0.435294 
of taking bet 
Sample Size 85 85 
Note:  The same subjects did both tests 
Difference in probablilities 0.258824 
Variance of difference 0.231793 
t statistic 2.993193 
Two-Tail Probability p<0.5% 




Table 9:  Combined First and Second Group of Students
Correlation of winning for self to betting for others
Win Self Bet Others
Win Self 1
Bet Others 0.08 1
t= 0.51 Therefore there is no correlation
between wining the bet for oneself  
and betting for others 
at 10% level for one-tailed test
Table 10:  Third Group of Students (High payoff)







Risk Safe 9 21%
Risk Risk 15 36%
Safe Safe 9 21%
Safe Risk 9 21%
Sample Size 42
Note:  The same subjects did both tests
Table 11:  Third Group of Students (High payoff)
Pooled Test of Difference in Betting Probabilities
For Self For Others
Average Probability 0.571429 0.571429
of taking bet
Sample Size 42 42
Note:  The same subjects did both tests
Difference in probablilities 0
Variance of difference 0.251
t statistic 0
Two-Tail Probability NA
Table 12:  Third Group of Students (High payoff)
Correlation of winning for self to betting for others
Win Self Bet Others
Win Self 1
Bet Others 0.324 1
t= 1.61 Therefore there is some correlation
between wining the bet for oneself  
and betting for others 
at 10% level for one-tailed test
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On the other hand, there is anecdotal evidence that individual entrepreneurs go out and take big risks, lose 
big, but then go out again and take big risks all for their own benefit.  Columbus ―Dad‖ Joiner, the Texas wildcat oil 
driller who found the great East Texas oil field was one such entrepreneur (Yergin 1991).  However, most 
government workers got into government by not taking risk and by desiring a steady, less risky job.  
 
What Tables 1 through 12 show is that the level of risk-taking by people for their own benefit is often 
higher than the level of risk-taking that people take for the benefit of others, that is there is a cautious shift for 
decisions for others.  More to the point, people are relatively less risk averse for their own benefit and become 
relatively more risk averse when they have to make a choice for the benefit of others.  While the results for the 
higher payoff show no-difference in risk taking, they still at least show that there is not a greater incidence of risk 
taking for the benefit of others than for oneself.  Plus the experience of a win or a loss tends to affect decision 
making for higher payoffs.  Since the tendency was for the safer, guaranteed money for others, it looks as though the 
decision makers were relatively more risk averse to others potential loss of the guaranteed money.  The evidence 
suggests that bureaucrats in a government-owned company or even decision makers in a relatively large corporation 
can be risk averse to investing in new business opportunities.   
 
There is also anecdotal evidence that this relatively greater risk averse behavior for the benefit of others 
occurs in the real world.  For example Sowell (2004) shows how protectionism for industries in India caused the 
Hindustan Motor Corporation to have no innovation in their cars for over 30 years.  Innovation both requires the risk 
to experiment and the risk to take redesigned products into the market place.  The Hindustan Motor Corporation 
didn‘t have to take the risk of implementing innovation, which could have incurred greater costs, since it knew there 
was no competition, and so it would not lose market share by not taking any risks.  Therefore risk taking, or the lack 
thereof, plays a huge role in any decision process no matter the specific engineering characteristics or complexity.  
This is exactly what Ellman and Kontorovich (1992) say caused the fall of the Soviet Union—a lack of innovation, 
i.e. a lack of risk taking. 
 
Further research on this subject might include having a recurring decision to roll the dice for oneself several 
times to see if risk taking changes with experience, and have a recurring decision to roll the dice for the rest of the 
group to see if risk taking for others also changes with experience.  This would be different than the Holt and Laury 
method where several different risk decisions are made in sequence because the Holt and Laury method only has a 
payoff after all the sequence of decisions are made.  What we are talking about is having a participant make a 
decision and then experience the payoff to others, then make another decision and then experience that payoff to 
others, etc.  If participants had to choose a risky or safe bet for others on a recurring basis, and be present as the 
group is rewarded or not on each subsequent round, then they might tend to become even more risk averse over time 
as they inevitably experience a loss as the Jablonowski evidence suggests.  Based on some anecdotal evidence, a 
higher level of caution could occur if the game was repeated for one decision maker since the people in the group 
affected by the decision maker sometimes would say things like, ―you should have taken the safe bet.‖  A few asked 
why decision makers didn‘t bet when they were cautious, although most participants were happy with whatever the 
decision maker decided.  Nevertheless, it may be the case that negative experience with risky outcomes can enhance 




In this paper, the effect of making decisions for oneself and for the benefit of other people was looked at 
and it was found that people are more willing to take risks for themselves and less willing to take risks for the 
benefit of others.  That is, there is a cautious shift between the decisions that involve the potential gain for oneself 
versus the potential gain for others.  The difference in the ratio of taking a bet for one‘s own gain and for the gain of 
others is significant and substantial at lower stakes.   
 
This risk averse behavior may happen at government-owned corporations or very large publicly traded 
corporations as well.  Anecdotal evidence (Sowell 2004 and Helfand et. al. 2007) suggests that many government-
owned corporations or very large corporations invest less in new innovations as opposed to smaller companies 
where more innovation occurs.  The fact that smaller companies are more prone to riskier decision-making behavior 
or wiliness to innovate lies in the need to survive the competitive market place.  The behavior of those people 
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making decisions for the benefit of others may be affected by risk aversion.  This may be one reason why 
government owned companies and even some large publicly traded corporations do not aggressively enter new 
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